Obligations to Future Generations (Golding)

RJ: A set of practices, P, is morally justifiable iff P would be unanimously selected among self-interested, rational planners in the Original Position.

Two Questions:

Q1. Is it morally wrong to perform actions that are harmful to future generations?
Q2. Do we have moral obligations to future generations? (Equivalently to some: do they have rights or claims against us?)


The Non-existence Argument:

1. Distant future generations do not exist.
2. If distant future generations do not exist, then distant future generations do not have rights.
3. If distant future generations do not have rights, then we have no moral obligations to them.
4. Therefore, we have no moral obligations to future generations.


Some conceptions of “moral community”:

MC1. x is in the same moral community as y iff x and y have entered into an explicit obligation-generating contract with each other.

MC2. x is in the same moral community as y iff x and y are part of a mutually benefiting social arrangement.

MC3. x is in the same moral community as y iff y acknowledges that what constitutes a good for x also constitutes a good for y.


Golding’s Argument Against Obligations to Distant Future Generations:

  1. We do not know what will constitute a good for members of distant future generations.
  2. If (1), then members of distant future generations are not part of our moral community.
  3. If distant future generations are not part of our moral community, then we do not have moral obligations to benefit distant future generations.
  4. Therefore, we do not have moral obligations to benefit distant future generations.

What, then, is the nature of our limited moral obligations to distant future generations according to Golding?