Kant's Ethics and Animals

CI1: An act token A is morally right if and only if the agent of A can consistently will that the generalized form of the maxim of A be a law of nature.

D1: M is the maxim of act token A =df. M is a general policy statement describing the situation the agent of A takes himself to be in, and the sort of action he takes himself to be performing when he does A.

D2: x is an end in itself =df. x has value in itself; x would continue to have this value even if x did not lead to anything else.

"rational nature exists as an end in itself.''

Contrasting with ends are means. Some things possess a kind of value that they would not continue to have if they didn’t (i) lead to the existence of further bearers of positive value or (ii) prevent things of negative value from obtaining. If completely cut off from their causal chains, means would no longer be valuable as means; in fact, they would no longer be means.

D3: x is a means (and not an end) =df. x has value in virtue of what it leads to or prevents; x would lose this value if x did not lead to other valuable things or prevent things of negative value from obtaining.

"Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."

"A rational being, by his very nature an end and consequently an end in himself, must serve for every maxim as a condition limiting all merely relative and arbitrary ends."

"So act in relation to every rational being (both to yourself and to others) that he may at the same time count in your maxim as an end in himself."

CI2: An act is morally right if and only if the agent, in performing it, refrains from treating any person as a mere means.

CI2': An act is morally right if and only if, in performing it, the agent refrains from treating any person as a means.

"Persons ... are not merely subjective ends whose existence as an object of our actions has a value for us: they are objective ends--that is, things whose existence is in itself an end, and indeed an end such that in its place we can put no other end to which they should serve simply as means; for unless this is so, nothing at all of absolute value would be found anywhere. But if all value were conditioned--that is, contingent--then no supreme principle could be found for reason at all."

"People are Ends" Argument

(1) If people are not ends in themselves, then nothing is an end in itself.
(2) If nothing is an end in itself, then there is never any reason to act in one way rather than in any other.
(3) There is sometimes a reason to act in one way rather than in another.
(4) Therefore, people are ends in themselves.

'The greatest problem for CI2 is not, however, the lack of a convincing proof. Nor is it that CI2 is subject to obvious counter-examples. Rather, the main difficulty with CI2 is that its meaning is never made sufficiently clear. The most troublesome concept in this version of the categorical imperative is the concept of "treating someone as a mere means." ' (Fred Feldman)

D4: A treats B as a mere means =df. A treats B in such a way that if B knew all about it, B would not want A to treat him in that way.

D5: A treats B as a mere means =df. B has some goal, and A could help B achieve that goal, but A refrains from doing so.

D6: A treats B as a mere means =df. B has some rational goal, and A can help B achieve that goal, but A refrains from doing so.

Be able to present arguments intended to illustrate that however we interpret Kant's phrase "mere means" (staying, of course, within the constraints of the spirit of Kant's text), C12 fails as an all-encompassing acceptable normative theory. Be prepared to use a case about the environment (possibly one about animals) to illustrate this point.

What are the implications of C12 for the treatment of animals?

A Kantian Principle about Duties

K: x has direct duties to y iff y is a rational being.

In his Lectures on Ethics, Kant suggests that a couple of principles seemingly distinct from CI2 should play a prominent role in our treatment of animals as well as, perhaps, in all of our endeavors.

"Such action helps to support us in our duties towards human beings, where they are bounden duties."

"[W]e have duties towards the animals because thus we cultivate the corresponding duties towards human beings."

"[H]is act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards mankind."

SD1: If acts of type F develop in us a stronger disposition to treat rational entities in a morally acceptable manner, then we are morally required to perform acts of type F when relevant situations arise.

SD2: If acts of type F develop in us a stronger disposition to treat rational entities in a morally unacceptable manner, then we are morally required to refrain from performing acts of type F when relevant situations arise.

Are SD1 and SD2 true? What conceptual relations, if any, are there between CI2 and the two SD principles? Do you agree with Kant that treating animals inhumanely always develops in us a disposition to treat rational entities in morally unacceptable ways? Be able to defend your position--whether you're a Kantian or a critic of Kant's positions here.

Back to Ends and Rationality

Like many other properties, it seems like rationality can come in degrees. Some people are much more rational than others. Problem cases: kids, people with low IQs, the comatose. What might be the ramifications of degrees of rationality for Kantian ethics?

The Failure of CI2: Animal-style

“Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties to others, the natural end which all men seek is their own happiness. Now humanity could no doubt subsist if everybody contributed nothing to the happiness of others but at the same time refrained from deliberately impairing their happiness. This is, however, merely to agree negatively and not positively with humanity as an end in itself unless every one endeavours also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends of others. For the ends of a subject who is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends.”

Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

“Vivisectionists, who use living animals for their experiments, certainly act cruelly, although their aim is praiseworthy, and they can justify their cruelty, since animals must be regarded as man’s instruments; but any such cruelty for sport cannot be justified.”

Kant, Lectures on Ethics

Kant seems to suggest here that we are never morally justified in harming animals for sport. Is this implied by C12? What does CI2 imply about controversial cases concerning animals?

Cougars: Ranchers, Farmers, Animal Rights Activists, Naturalists (aesthetic enhancement, vibrancy of ecosystems), Hunters (deer), Hunters (cougar)

Other predator problems: wolves
Other problems: farrow piggies

These problem cases—at least as I see them—seem to spell doom for CI2.