Goodpaster, Hettinger, Throop, Paden

Formulations of the various views under discussion

The Interest Principle: Only beings with interests are morally considerable.

Two senses of ‘interest’:

D1. x has interests =df. x has desires, wants, or aims.

D2. x has interests =df. x can be benefited or harmed.

The Sentience Principle (SP): x is morally considerable iff x is sentient.

The Life Principle (LP): x is morally considerable iff x is alive.

Individualism: All the value in nature can be found in individual organisms or objects; only individuals are intrinsically valuable and require protection. (SP, LP)

Holism: There is some value in nature that is not reducible to the value of individuals; there are reasons to enact environmental policies that are not based on the welfare of any individuals.

“A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends otherwise.” (Aldo Leopold)

Ecocentrism: There is intrinsic value in ecosystems that is not reducible to the intrinsic values of its component organisms. (Entails Holism)

Leopoldian Ecocentrism (LE): Ecosystems have intrinsic value; the health or well-being of an ecosystem is measured by its stability (or equilibrium, balance, or integrity); the intrinsic value of an ecosystem depends on its level of stability.

D3. x is wild =df. x is not influenced, altered, or controlled by humans.

Wildness Ecocentrism (WE): Wildness is intrinsically valuable; the intrinsic value of an ecosystem depends, in part, on its degree of wildness (the wilder, the better).

Product Preservationism: see Individualism

Process Preservationism: see Ecocentrism

Paden’s Beauty View: Beautiful things are morally considerable or intrinsically valuable, and we have a duty to protect them. (186)