Kant's Ethics

CI1: An act token A is morally right if and only if the agent of A can consistently will that the generalized form of the maxim of A be a law of nature.

D1: M is the maxim of act token A =df. M is a general policy statement describing the situation the agent of A takes himself to be in, and the sort of action he takes himself to be performing when he does A.

D2: x is an end =df. x has value in itself; x would continue to have this value even if x did not lead to (or prevent) anything else.

"rational nature exists as an end in itself.''

Contrasting with ends are means. Some things possess a kind of value that they would not continue to have if they didn’t (i) lead to the existence of further bearers of positive value or (ii) prevent things of negative value from obtaining. If completely cut off from their causal chains, means would no longer be valuable as means; in fact, they would no longer be means.

D3: x is a means (and not an end) =df. x has value in virtue of what it leads to or prevents; x would lose this value if x did not lead to other valuable things or prevent things of negative value from obtaining.

"Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."

"A rational being, by his very nature an end and consequently an end in himself, must serve for every maxim as a condition limiting all merely relative and arbitrary ends."

"So act in relation to every rational being (both to yourself and to others) that he may at the same time count in your maxim as an end in himself."

CI2: An act is morally right if and only if the agent, in performing it, refrains from treating any person as a mere means.

CI2': An act is morally right if and only if, in performing it, the agent refrains from treating any person as a means.

"Persons ... are not merely subjective ends whose existence as an object of our actions has a value for us: they are objective ends--that is, things whose existence is in itself an end, and indeed an end such that in its place we can put no other end to which they should serve simply as means; for unless this is so, nothing at all of absolute value would be found anywhere. But if all value were conditioned--that is, contingent--then no supreme principle could be found for reason at all."

"People are Ends" Argument

(1) If people are not ends in themselves, then nothing is an end in itself.
(2) If nothing is an end in itself, then there is never any reason to act in one way rather than in any other.
(3) There is sometimes a reason to act in one way rather than in another.
(4) Therefore, people are ends in themselves.

'The greatest problem for CI2 is not, however, the lack of a convincing proof. Nor is it that CI2 is subject to obvious counter-examples. Rather, the main difficulty with CI2 is that its meaning is never made sufficiently clear. The most troublesome concept in this version of the categorical imperative is the concept of "treating someone as a mere means." ' (Fred Feldman)

D4: A treats B as a mere means =df. A treats B in such a way that if B knew all about it, B would not want A to treat him in that way.

D5: A treats B as a mere means =df. B has some goal, and A could help B achieve that goal, but A refrains from doing so.

D6: A treats B as a mere means =df. B has some rational goal, and A can help B achieve that goal, but A refrains from doing so.

Be able to present arguments intended to illustrate that however we interpret Kant's phrase "mere means" (staying, of course, within the constraints of the spirit of Kant's text), C12 fails as an all-encompassing acceptable normative theory. Be prepared to utilize a specific case to illustrate this point.

Back to Ends and Rationality

Like many other properties, it seems like rationality can come in degrees. Some people are much more rational than others. Problem cases: kids, people with low IQs, the comatose. What might be the ramifications of degrees of rationality for Kantian ethics?