United Nations Amphibious Forces in WWII |
The US and her allies did not have enough men and material to cover the
entire ocean. A successful invasion entailed coordinating ground, sea
and air forces from all of the united nations across the vast expanse of
the Pacific. Planning an invasion took more time than executing it.
Several invasions could be planned in the time it took to execute one.
Experience gained by the allies in clawing their way up
New Guinea showed that combat ships were too valuable to leave idle
during the planning phase. They also had no extra room to provide
for all the extra personnel from the various
forces needed to organize the invasion forces.
Enter a new class of ship, the Auxiliary General Communications ship.
The name, like the appearance, was deceptive. It was designed to look like
a supply ship. The crews were told to not reveal the nature of the
mission. Even today, there is not a lot of information available
on the AGC fleet. It was lightly
armed so as to not attract attention, but they held the brains
behind the amphibious assault groups.
The details of an invasion would be planned by the assault commanders on
each of the Pacific AGCs according to strategic
directions. The invasion date
would be decided on and forces would converge from across the
Pacific on the target site on the date planned. The amphibious
planning groups were never large but the forces they could muster were.
This enabled the fighting groups, which were resupplied while at
sea, to always be free to fight.
A fighting force would finish a landing one day, be assigned a new task
force name and be steaming off to the next fight under a different
admiral the next. The following table, which shows united nations
landings in the Phillipines in the last year of the war shows just how
mobile and effective the Phib groups became in clearing out the Japanese.
| D-day1945 | Target | Naval Unit | Naval Command | Ground Unit | Ground Command | Target Secured |
| 28 Feb | Palawan | 8th Phib | Fechteler | 41st Div | Haney | 22 Apr |
| 10 Mar | Zamboanga | 6Th Phib | Royal | 41St Div | Doe | 15 Aug |
| 18 Mar | Panay & W. Negros | 9Th Phib | Struble | 40Th Div | Brush | 4 Jun |
| 26 Mar | Cebu | TG 78.2 | Sprague | Americal | Arnold | 18 Apr |
| 11 Apr | Bohol | TU 78.3.3 | Deutermann | 164Th Inf | Arnold | 20 Apr |
| 26 Apr | S.E. Negros | TU 78.3.3 | Deutermann | 164Th Inf | Arnold | 12 Jun |
| 17 Apr | Mindanao | 8Th Phib | Noble | X Corps | Sibert | 15 Aug |
| 1 May | Tarakan | TG 78.1 | Royal | Aus I Corps | Morshead | 30 May |
| 10 Jun | Brunei Bay | TG 78.1 | Royal | 9Th Aus Div | Wotten | 1 Jul |
| 1 Jul | Balikpapan | 8Th Phib | Noble | 7Th Aus Div | Milford | 22 Jul |
US ships spent very little time in port compared to the British and Japanese in large part because the AGC command brought planning down to the grass root level. It also enabled the united nations forces to deploy overwhelming air, sea and land forces at each invasion they undertook. This could not have been done if each 'Phib' group had its own army, its own navy and its own air force.